Brussels vs. Beijing: Who Writes the Rules of Global Tech?

By Emilija Januseviciute, 1st Year IEL Student

I. Introduction

Before addressing

who sets the rules for global technology, it is important to understand why global tech is necessary.[1] Why can’t each country be fully independent and freely govern its own technology within its borders? The answer is simple: it is too expensive. Consider the scenario of a major technology entrepreneur developing 5G network technology within Estonia. While such endeavours could generate thousands in profit, they also entail the potential loss of millions.  Technologies require a minimum market size larger than that of  individual countries.[2]   They can be critical parts of national infrastructure and have national security implications.[3] Globalised, harmonised regulatory standards are crucial for lowering trade barriers and enabling more countries to benefit from technology[4] This is where two major technology regulatory influences come into play: the ‘Brussels effect’, a metonym for the EU, and the ‘Beijing effect’, a metonym for China.[5] The main aim of this blog is not to present the two models as sworn enemies in a tug-of-war, but to compare them analytically as sources of regulatory power that can coexist.

II. The Brussels Effect

Columbia law professor Anu Bradford coined the term ‘Brussels effect’ to describe the European Union's power to shape the digital future through regulatory influence and set global standards.[6] Recent regulatory developments have validated this strategy. The Digital Markets Act aims to make digital markets fairer and more contestable by imposing obligations and prohibitions on major tech giants, also known as “gatekeepers”.[7] Beyond competition policy, the EU has extended its regulatory framework to artificial intelligence. The AI Act, the world's first comprehensive AI law, classifies AI systems by risk, places  most obligations on AI providers, and sets strict requirements for AI safety and transparency.[8] Finally, the EU is planning and hopes to establish the Digital Networks Act, which, according to the European Commission, “will modernise the legal framework for connectivity to boost innovation and investment in an advanced and resilient digital infrastructure in the European Union”.[9] Even though these regulatory initiatives appear to be formally confined to the borders of the European Union, their implications extend well beyond its borders. This invisible hand regulating digital markets and technology on a global scale does not stem from coercion, but simply from market dynamics. As cited by Bradford in the “The European Crypto Initiative”, it is concluded that the Brussels effect arises because of the EU’s:

A.    Market Size

The EU boasts a large consumer market that draws companies globally. These firms usually adhere to the EU’s strict regulations to establish a foothold in Europe.[10]

B.    Regulatory Capacity

The EU has the institutional framework and expertise needed to develop and implement regulations efficiently.[11]

C.    Stringent Standards

EU regulations tend to be more comprehensive and demanding than those elsewhere, highlighting a  dedication to protecting consumer rights, environmental health, and societal welfare.[12]

D.   Inelastic Targets

The EU concentrates on regulating sectors  such as consumer protection, where regulated entities have limited options to relocate and bypass EU rules. Companies must comply with the EU regulations to access the European market.[13]

The ‘Brussels Effect’ has significantly influenced many countries. The clearest example is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which has inspired other jurisdictions worldwide to adopt similar regulations.[14] Examples include the California Consumer Privacy Act, South Africa's Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA), and India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA).[15] Nevertheless, the ‘Brussels Effect’ is not without constraints. For instance, the Financial Times article, “How the ‘Brussels effect’ backfired,” explores the EU’s declining regulatory influence.[16] The article highlights that, Bradford acknowledged the EU’s considerable regulatory power but noted that its global leadership in digital regulation may have weakened compared with the period when it introduced the GDPR.[17] 

The article further notes that Oliver Bisazza, CEO of MedTech Europe, stated that the complexity of the new regulations, despite being designed to better protect patients, had the perverse effect of making the EU less attractive for companies registering new devices.[18] Overall, the EU's regulatory power can have both positive and negative consequences. It provides transparency, expertise, and thorough standards, but it also receives criticism for overburdening developers with obligations and excessive regulation, which can hinder business growth.

III. The Beijing Effect

Xi Jinping is promoting what the World Economic Forum now calls “The Fourth Industrial Revolution,” a fusion of the digital, biological, and physical worlds.[19] China is home to the world's largest e-commerce market, the most Internet users, and rapidly expanding tech companies.[20] 

The integration of these advancements is evident in China, where innovations such as: a cashless payment system, a social credit framework, a ‘health code’ for tracking infectious diseases, and online courts for dispute resolution have become standard.[21] Nevertheless, this blog concentrates on global technology, specifically analysing China‘s regulatory influence beyond its borders - the ‘Beijing Effect’. In the article “The Beijing Effect: China‘s Digital Silk Road as Transnational Data Governance,” the authors note that the COVID-19 pandemic marked a turning point, increasing reliance on digital technologies to maintain business operations in virtual environments.[22] As a result, data became even more crucial to the global economy, as the demand for and reliance on digital infrastructure increased.[23] This is where ’Beijing effect’ arises, becoming more prominent due to:

A.    Demand for digital infrastructure

Companies like Huawei, Alibaba, and Tencent increasingly provide telecommunication and e-commerce services across the globe. Governments in emerging economies like Pakistan demand Chinese-built digital infrastructure and emulate China’s approach to data governance to pursue data sovereignty and further develop digitally. [24] 

B.    Demand for data sovereignty

Developing countries with increasing demand for such data infrastructure might find the idea of ‘data sovereignty’ compelling. China has repeatedly promoted ‘cyber sovereignty’ and shifted its focus to ‘data sovereignty’ in its internal data governance, thereby affirming the legitimacy of government control over data flows. Think of China's firewall, where its citizens can't access foreign media due to government control.[25]

C.    Demand for Economic development and social order

Developing countries seek Chinese digital infrastructure due to its potential to accelerate economic growth through improved connectivity, e-commerce, and digital modernisation. Additionally, it offers a better social order through surveillance, smart city systems, and data-sovereignty-based governance.[26]

Nevertheless, the ‘Beijing Effect’, also faces several setbacks. According to the article “China’s Tech Regulation Paradox Amid Great Power Competition,” China faces a massive challenge in regulating technology outflows without undermining its global competitiveness, or, according to the author, its “going out” strategy in the tech sector.[27]  In recent years, China has significantly increased regulatory oversight of exports of mineral resources and key technologies.[28] Initially, these measures aimed to counter U.S. tariffs and technology bans, shielding China’s technological leverage.[29] Strict domestic rules might improve short-term security but could hinder the long-term growth of innovation by restricting technology exports. If regulations continue to tighten domestically while external barriers remain strong, the commercial prospects in the domestic market could sharply decline.

In summary, the ‘Beijing Effect’ is a result of multiple factors: the demand for digital infrastructure, which Chinese companies readily supply; the call for data sovereignty, which China actively promotes; and the pursuit of economic growth and social stability, which China also seeks to advance. However, China faces many challenges and backlash, including issues with overregulation and the tension between wanting to enhance long-term security and simultaneously growing the economy.

IV. Shared Objectives, Competing Visions

A.    Shared Objectives:

The EU’s and China’s primary shared objective is to ensure that technology companies operate in accordance with their respective regulatory frameworks and policy objectives.[30]  Both parties often use regulatory power to shape global technology regulations.[31] 

In 2000, an agreement for scientific and technological cooperation between the European Community and the Government of the People's Republic of China has been signed. The purpose of this agreement and decision was to create a formal framework for collaboration between the EU, and China, as well as promoting, developing, and facilitating joint research and development in science and technology areas of mutual interest.[32] 

Initiatives under this agreement follow principles of mutual benefit; reciprocal access to activities; timely information exchange; and protection of intellectual property rights. The document covers all research, technology development, and demonstration areas.[33] This encourages Chinese participation in EU projects, as well as EU involvement in Chinese projects, pooling of research efforts, scientist exchanges, organisation of joint seminars, conferences, workshops, sharing equipment and information, and exchanging legal and procedural practices.[34] 

B.    Competing Visions:

Let’s briefly set aside law and politics to explore the concepts of individualism and collectivism. Although broad generalisations can oversimplify, it is still helpful to observe that China has historically been more collectivist, whereas European societies have tended to favour individualism.[35]

Nowadays, European Union promotes a rights-based model that emphasises individual freedoms, such as freedom of expression, and the right to privacy. China adopts a state-centred approach that relies heavily on surveillance mechanisms and extensive data governance.[36]   This approach is clear in a model that has been adopted by China  which combines technological progress with government action and social governance.[37] Therefore, Digital regulation is not solely focused on individual protection but also on maintaining social stability, fostering economic growth, and ensuring national security.[38]

To summarize, the European Union views data mainly as a matter of individual rights, whereas China increasingly regards data as a strategic resource aligned with broader state goals.[39] 

VI. Conclusion

In short, both the ‘Brussels Effect’ and the ‘Beijing Effect’ have contributed to shaping global regulatory frameworks. Brussels has done so by implementing its regulatory developments, including the GDPR, the AI Act, along with the Digital Markets Act which may be established in the future.[40] The ‘Brussels Effect’ arises from the EU's large market size, regulatory capacity, and ability to create comprehensive regulations that are difficult for companies to circumvent. Nevertheless, the EU approach to technology has its drawbacks, as overregulation can hinder business growth.[41] On the other hand, the ‘Beijing Effect’ arises from increased demand for digital infrastructure in China. China's tech companies offer various telecommunications and e-commerce services worldwide.[42] Developing countries like Pakistan find the idea of ‘data sovereignty’ compelling and want to boost economic growth and increase social order.[43] China, on the other hand, faces its own challenges. For instance, there is clash between the need to overregulate and the desire to grow the economy.[44] 

The EU and China each let their regulations shape global technology. Both parties cooperate to advance global technology and promote the development of science and technology in areas of mutual interest.[45] Nevertheless, the EU favours individualism, while China is predominantly collectivist and uses surveillance and data governance to maintain social stability, economic growth, and security.[46] 

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[1] In this article, 'global' refers to interconnected systems that encompass the entire world, while 'technology' denotes new machinery and equipment created through scientific knowledge or processes.

[2] ‘Global Technology Governance A Multistakeholder Approach’ (The World Economic Forum In Collaboration with Thunderbird School of Global Management and Arizona State University, October 2019) <https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-49432817> accessed 8 February 2026.

[3] ibid.

[4] ibid.

[5] Matthew. S. Erie, Thomas Streinz ‘The Beijing  Effect: China‘s Digital Silk Road As Transnational Data Governance’ (February 2021), vol. 54, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics <https://www.nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/NYUJILP_Vol54.1_Erie_Streinz_1-91.pdf> accessed 8 February 2026.

[6] Anu Bradford, ‘The Brussels  Effect: How the European Union Rules the World’ (OUP 27 March 2020).

[7] Regulation (EU) 1925 (Digital Markets Act) [2022] | OJ L 265/1.

[8] Regulation (EU) 1689 (Artificial Intelligence Act) [13 June 2024] | OJ L series.

[9] Commission, ‘Proposal Regulation Digital Networks Act (DNA)’ COM(2026) 16.

[10] European Crypto Initiative ‘The Brussels Effect’ <https://eu.ci/the-brussels-effect/>  accessed 10 February 2026.

[11] ibid.

[12] ibid.

[13] ibid.

[14] Ronan Murphy,‘Mapping the Brussels Effect: The GDPR Goes Global’ (CEPA, 7 August 2025) <https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/mapping-the-brussels-effect-the-gdpr-goes-global/>  accessed 11 February 2026.

[15] ibid.

[16] Peter Foster, Barbara Moens, ‘How the ‘Brussels effect’  backfired’ (Financial Times, 14 December 2025) <https://www.ft.com/content/abc3002e-a7be-48e2-8197-aeddf937afec> accessed 11 February 2026.

[17] ibid.

[18] ibid.

[19] Matthew. S. Erie, Thomas Streinz ‘The Beijing  Effect: China‘s Digital Silk Road As Transnational Data Governance’ (February 2021), 54 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics <https://www.nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/NYUJILP_Vol54.1_Erie_Streinz_1-91.pdf> accessed 8 February 2026.

[20] ibid.

[21] ibid.

[22] ibid.

[23] ibid.

[24] ibid.

[25] ibid.

[26] ibid.

[27] Xing Jiaying, ‘China’s Tech Regulation Paradox Amid Great Power Competition’ (The Diplomat, 31 January 2026) <https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/chinas-tech-regulation-paradox-amid-great-power-competition/>  accessed 12 February 2026.

[28] ibid.

[29] ibid.

[30] Agreement (EU) 22000A0111(02) (Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation between the European Community and the Government of the People's Republic of China) [2000] | OJ L 6 p.40-45.

[31] ibid.

[32] ibid.

[33] ibid.

[34] ibid.

[35] The Logical Place, ‘Collectivism in Asia vs Individualism in Europe’ (26 August 2025) <https://yandoo.wordpress.com/2025/08/26/collectivism-in-asia-vs-individualism-in-europe/>  accessed 15 February 2026.

[36] Longkun Wu ‘Contrast between Collectivism and Individualism in Chinese and Western Culture’ (2025), Vol. 18, No. 1 Xi’an Shiyou University, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710065, China <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/388330078_Contrast_between_Collectivism_and_Individualism_in_Chinese_and_Western_Culture> accessed 15 February 2026.

[37] ibid.

[38] ibid.

[39] ibid.

[40] Brad McAllister, ‘The Brussels Effect: How Europe Shapes Tech Without Dominating It’ (Linkedin 7 May 2025) <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/brussels-effect-how-europe-shapes-tech-without-brad-mcallister-lsbde/> accessed 8 February 2026.

[41] European Crypto Initiative ‘The Brussels Effect’ <https://eu.ci/the-brussels-effect/> accessed 10 February 2026.

[42] Matthew. S. Erie, Thomas Streinz ‘The Beijing Effect: China’s Digital Silk Road As Transnational Data Governance’ (February 2021), vol. 54, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics <https://www.nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/NYUJILP_Vol54.1_Erie_Streinz_1-91.pdf> accessed 8 February 2026.

[43] ibid.

[44] Xing Jiaying, ‘China’s Tech Regulation Paradox Amid Great Power Competition’ (The Diplomat, 31 January 2026) <https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/chinas-tech-regulation-paradox-amid-great-power-competition/> accessed 12 February 2026.

[45] Agreement (EU)  22000A0111(02) (Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation between the European Community and the Government of the People's Republic of China) [2000] | OJ L 6 p.40-45.

[46] Longkun Wu ‘Contrast between Collectivism and Individualism in Chinese and Western Culture’ (2025), Vol. 18, No. 1 Xi’an Shiyou University, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710065, China <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/388330078_Contrast_between_Collectivism_and_Individualism_in_Chinese_and_Western_Culture> accessed 15 February 2026.